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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
8...\Ml~EL

MOORE and
)
CHARLES H. YOORE,
Plaitttiff s a'ki ...J.ppellaftts,
\

vs.
DESERET Ln.. E

,l

STOCI~

Case No.
4930

)

t01IP ...-L."\1,
Defe·ndat~t

tJnd Respotklent,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PI.EADINGS
In their final analysis the pleadings are :

A complaint to quiet title by adverse possession to
land lying north and west of the new railroad track in
Section 16, Tp. 5 X. R. 7 E. S. L. M.

Answer denying plaintiff's title; alleging title in defendant, and pleading an estoppel to deny defendant's
title by reason of a contract (verbal on the part of
plaintiffs) and acts in pursuance thereof and the execution of certain deeds.
And plaintiffs reply and deny defendant's title;
plead the statute of frauds to the verbal agreement, fail-
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ure to· authorize delivery of the deed, and attempt to
plead fraud.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant. Defendant and one David Moore entered into
a written contract, (plffs. Ex. 1) for the exchange of certain lands in said contract described. Plaintiffs did not
sign this contract, but the land in controversy was covered therein, and plaintiffs agreed to said contract and
that their land should be governed thereby, in exchange
for certain other land to be received by them separately,
which lands are described in the ans.wer.;,_ David Moore
died and his interest was taken over by David l\1oore
& Sons, Inc. The transaction became a triangular affair
between the plaintiffs, David Moore & Sons, Inc., and
the defenda~t. All parties went into the possession of
the respective lands they were to receive, and were so
possessed :at·the comniencement· ofithis ·actl.dn-·-; :~~~h party
made valuable improvements on the land it possessed,
and Samuel Moore made most of defendant's improvements. Each party had the use and products from his
said land to the commencement of this action. By mutual
understanding the taxes were _pard by the record title
holder .for the use of the equitable title holder in possession. The contract provided for deeds when certain
surveys were made. The point and line of survey was
determined at the time of making the contract. The
survey .wa~s to determine the acreage. When David
2
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...r

lloore die<t it enu~t'tl tlt'!ay in ~PennHg- t Itt' dt'PdH. hut
the dt)a1 "·n~ tH)t rallt,d tl!L J)n,·id :\lunrt' & ~ons, Ine..

and these plninti tY~ tn,·nt'd tht' lnnd in ~t.'e. l(i, rrp. ;>
X. R. 7 r:. s. L. 'It'ridinn .. whieh is iHt'lUdt'd in said
exchange. I'he~e part it's t'Xt't'Hh'd a dt't'd <.'OllY<.'Y illg- to
defendant the part of St'l'. lt) it \\·as to rt't'l'iYe tutdPr
said exchange. Said deed "·as subst't}Ut'ntly deliYt'l't'd by
Samuel ~1oore to T. E. ~loore, "-ho was president of
Dand Moore & Sons. Inc. ''with instructions for him to
close the deal and deliver the deed to defendant.'' These
instruction5 were ne,er modilied or reYoked. The survey
completed and the acreage determined, this defendant
conveyed the land intended in the contract to David
~foore & Sons. Inc. David Moore & Sons, Inc. conveyed
the land intended in the contract to defendant, and at
the same time deli,ered the said deed to the land in
See. 16.
Subsequent to the execution of plaintiff's Ex. 1,
(the Contract of Exchange) these plaintiffs and David
Moore & Sons, Inc. determined what land the plaintiffs
were to recei'e in this exchange. (See Plffs. Ex. 8) Defendant tendered to plaintiff, Samuel l\Ioore a deed to
the land so determined, which deed was refused. A deed
was tendered to plaintiff, Charles H. ~Ioore, for his land,
and by him accepted and recorded.
A dispute arose between the plaintiffs and David
Moore & Sons, Inc., as to the land plaintiffs were to
receive under Plaintiff's Ex. 8. It involved the location of the cross-fence. Defendant was not made aware

3
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of this dispute until after the exchange had been completed between it and David Moore & Sons, Inc. Plaintiffs now seek to claim the land received by defendant
from them in Sec. 16. Neither has offered to make good
the expenditures of defendant under the contract of exchange; each continues in the possession of the land
it was to receive under the contract of exchange, and
the plaintiff Charles H. Moore holds a deed he had recorded to the land he received under the exchange. ( Plffs.
Ex. 7), and gave to Defendant a deed of further assurance. (Plffs. Ex. 5). David Moore & Sons, Inc., is not
a party to the action.
POINTS AND AUTHORITY
This exchange of lands is taken out of the provisions of Sees. 487 4, 5811, 5813 and 5113 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, because there was part performance.
In that, there was a mutual assent and agreement
that each party should and they did immediately enter
into the possession of and claim as their own the respective tracts exchanged, and so continued to possess
and claim up to the commencement of this action, and
had an arrangement as to payment of taxes·, and in
reliance on said exchange the defendant, without objection by plaintiffs, made valuable and permanent improvements thereon, and each party to said exchange
had the use and products from his respective land.
4
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Each pnrty tlllfl'red t hl• lnnd nud l'la imed it as hh~
own: Testimony of ~anlllt.'l ~lllOrl\ (.A bs. ~~l, 'frnns. 49,
\l)s. \),.
""'- T rans. u\.)-J
=- =- =- q
., " 'l~ ra u~. b:..,
. ) :.\ bs. 39, T rans.
."1.
. , .:.\ b s . .._)~.
68): Charles H. lloore, ( ..:\bs. 43, Trans. s:~-8~>); T. E.
Moore, (Respts ...\bs. 6-7, Trnns. ~lS-100): 'Villinm Moss,
(..-\.bs. 59, Trans. 168): Sterns Hatch, (.~:\bs. 5'7, Trans.
59-60): Clarence F. ~oore, ( . .\bs. 62, Trnns. 160-180).
In reliance on the exchange permanent \"aluable
improYements v.-ere made: '"festimony of Samuel Moore,
""I built many of the partition fences for the Live Stock
Company between 1919 and 1925 · ', ( ...\ bs. 38, Trans. 60) ;
William Moss, (Respts. Abs. 13-15, Trans. 165-171);
T. E. :Yuore, _\.bs. ( Abs. 46-7, Trans. 100-103; Clarence
F. ~oore, (Abs. 62, Trans. 162-180); Henry Moss, "I
understand our company has relied on the deal and kept
and improved the ground they were trading for'', (Abs.
56, Trans. 154).
There "Was an arrangement between the parties as
to payment of taxes. Testimony of Henry Moss, (Respts.
Abs. 11-12. Trans. 152-155).
A verbal agrement to exchange lands when followed
by possesion, is thereby part performance, and will be
enforced:
See= Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, Third Edition, Page 343, Sec. 134.
~so,

Gilbert vs. Slaker, (Cal.) 12 Pac. 172.

And a fortiori, a parol exchange of lands followed
by occupancy and substantial improvements thereon in
5
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reliance on the exchange, and payment of taxes, all done
with the consent and knowledge of the Vend or, in part
performance, and will be enforced.
See : Hogan vs. Swayze, et al. 65 U t. 380).
Also, Pomeroy on Contract (2d Ed.) Sec. 126, and
36 Cyc. Page 656, both cited in the above
case as sustaining the rule.
''The plaintiffs never repudiated the contract, on
the contrary, always acknowledged it.''
Samuel Moore, (Abs. 37-39, Trans. 60-68); Charles
H. Moore, (Trans. 84); Sterns Hatch, "Sam and Charlie
never repudiated the contract," (Abs. 57, Trans. 159).
(See other testimony heretofore referred to.) William
Moss, (Res:pts. Abs. 15, Trans. 169).
The disp:ute was betweetl David Moore & Sons, Inc., and
these plaintiffs and involved the location of a certain
cross-fence under a separate agreement between these
parties. (See Plffs. Ex. 8), and Tstimony of William
Moore, ( Abs. 31, Trans. 24).
The trial court found said fence to be located as
contended by David Moore & Sons, Inc., (See Abs. 18-19,
Par. 5 of Findings).
This finding is supported by the greater weight of
the evidence: Testimony of T. E. Moore, ''B-ecause Sam
gets aproximately the same acreage as he conveyed when
he takes to the cross fence in Sec. 21,'' ( Abs. 48-9, Trans.
110-12); "To give Sam to the cross fence in 32 he would
get much more in value than he sold.'' Abs. 48-9, Trans.
6
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110-11~): ~~un

on Yarinu~ Ot'l'H~lOH~ wnntc.'d to buy the
land b~t"~~en the trnek8 in ~l\l'. ~t~ from David l\loon' &
Sons. Ine. ,. Te8timony of
E. ~loort\. (~\hs. [)~-;);~,
Trans. 1~~~~); ('lar(:\nee F. :\loore, ( Ht\~pt~ ..Abs. 19-~0,
Trans. 1St1): Da¥id E. lloore, (~\hs. 64, Trans. 194);
Finally Sam and J. E. ~Ioore enter~d into a 'vritten
agreement to purchase the land b(:\t""een the traeks including that in See. 32. (See Defts. Exs. C & D.), (Abs.
-1~1. Trans. 113-120).

·r.

A.t no plaee in the record does it appear that the
plaintiffs made it known to defendant that land to a
certain cross fence in See.. 32 was claimed by them, and
it knew of no friction a bout the deal until 1927. Testimony of Henry :lloss, (Abs. 56, Trans. 154); Testimony
of Stearns Hatch, (.Abs. 57, Trans. 159-60.) (See PHis.
Exs. 15a to 15j inclusive).
The deed tendered was in accordance with the above
finding. (See Plffs. Ex. 4).
The abo-ve dispute between plaintiffs and David
Moore & Sons, Inc., in no way involved this defendant
in carrying out the contract of exchange, (Ex. 1).
At the comemncement of this action the contract
of exchange was complete. Testimony of T. E. Moore,
(Respts. Abs. 10, Trans. 128.) (And also the foregoing testimony)

''The time at which the completeness must be ascertained, is the commencement of the action.''
See: Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Con7
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tracts, Third Edition, Page 401, Sec. 158, and
cases cited.
Plaintiffs' Ex. 2, the deed from Samuel and Charles
H. Moore, et al. to the def'endant is in pursuance of
the contract of exchange, and there was a lawful delivery
to defendant.
Testimony of T. E. MOORE, "I had the deed
(Plffs. Ex. 5). Samuel delivered it to me sometime in the early part of Summer, 1922. Sl\:rpuel
and his brother tried to close the deal and met
some difficulty. Sam handed me the deed and
said, 'Fix this up as soon as you can ; the Deseret.
Live Stock Company said they couldn't deal with
Will and he is rio brother of mine'. Apparently
they had had a disagreemen. Sam said to take
it and deliver it to the Live Stock Company. He
delivered it to me at the front door of my garage
as I was coming out of the door. He never afterwards complained, as I remember, about delivering it nor asked me to return it." (Abs. 48, Trans.
108-110. On cross examination Mr. Moore testified: "I say that Sam g.ave ~e the deed in 1922
with explicit direction to close the trade, deliver
the deed and. that the directions were never
changed, modified or refuted.'' ( Abs. 55, Tra:ns.
145).

A deed delivered to a third person with instructions to deliver to the grantee, with intent of
the grantor that gr&ntee become possessed of the
premises is sufficient delivery.
See: 18 C. J. Pages 203-205, Sees. 99, 100 & 101.
''Delivery to a third person for the grantee,
without any reservation by the grantor <;>f a right
to recall it, is sufficient in ·law, and effects a complte transfer of the title to the property.'' 8 R. 0.
L. Page 991, Sec. 57.
8
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The live stock company "·as Dt.'\"tn· told that there
was a ded out in connection \vith this trnusnetion wh:ieh
should not be deliYered. T'estimouy, Smnuel 1\loort~,
(..lbs. 59,

Trnn~.

66); })ora :\Ioort.'. ( ...-\hs. 40, 'I'rnns. 71).

For this reason plaintitT~ are estopped to deny the
deed. Bailarge Y8. Clark, (Cal.) i~l Pac. :!ti8. rrhe
Syllabus to this case ~tatt.'~: .. One 'vho exellutes a voluntary deed to her husband, which she does not deliver,
but he steals from her possessiun, is estopped to assert
title against an innocent purchaser from him, etc.''
The foregoing discussion disposes of appellants assignments of error Xos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7, as to the
Court's Findings.
Appellants at Page 9 of their brief refer to a certain power of attorney. (Plffs. Ex. 9) purported to have
been given by Charles H. Moore to Samuel Moore, both
plaintiffs in this action.
This power has no bearing in the case because it is
a limited or speciol power and does not cover the point
in controversy. And if it did the only conclusion that
could be drawn between the plaintiffs herein and the defendant, would be that Samuel Moore has been empowered by Charles H. Moore to deal in his behalf in
relation to this exchange of lands, and could do nothing
contrary to the exchange as each were parties to it.

Appellants claim undue influence in obtaining the
deed from Charles H. Moore. (Plffs. Ex. 5).
Such undue influence 1s not pleaded by plaintiffs.
9
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(See Par. 12 & 13 of their reply) (Abs. 14-15 ). The
only allegations are general and conclusrons 9f law, while
to plead undue influence the allegations must be specific and set forth the things constituting undue influence.
See: Bancroft's Code Pleading, Vol. 1, Page 99,
Sec. 46, and cases cited.
To the introduction of any evidence of undue influence under such pleading the defendant made timely
objection. (See Trans. 87-90). The matter was argued
and at Page 90 of the Transcript the Court said: "I
wouldn't want to pass on that in advance, I said we
would receive it in evidence now and then as to the credence and the ruling in view of the allegation in the
reply that matter could be taken up later."
At Pages 124-125 of the Transcript, the Court makes
its ruling, holding that the objection is well taken and
that the evidence should not be considered.

In executing said deeds Charles H. Moore acted
voluntarily and with full knowledge of the facts. (Abs.
42-43, Trans. 76-90). And under these circumstances
there was no undue influence.
Hatch vs. Hatch, 46 Ut. 218
Frubang vs. Tilley et al., (U t.) 172 Pac. 676.
'The above disposes of plaintiff's assignment of error
No. 8 to the Findings.
Plaintiffs assign error because of the_ introduction
of defendants Ex. "C and D." These exhibits do not
represe·nt an offer of compromise between the parties to

10
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this netioMut ~~ !jlY '''"''nt t ht> n~rl't'llll'lll s "'"~"" ad t>d
upon by ~fttU*'f Sanlut.\1 ~(.)t)rt\ for Ht\n rly t\vo )'Par~,
and nre ndmi~~ion~ against him.
From the t't)rt\g"t)ing di~('Ussion it is clear that there
was a e.ontract of exehangt\. nnd that it was unambiguous, complete and certain. and that part of plaintiffs· land wa8 included in the contract and that they
acquiesced therein.
Xow, if plaintiffs' Ex. 2 is good as a valid deed,
then both are estopped by deed. 21 C. J. Page 1067,
·1~
Sec. -v.

The same doctrine applies as to plaintiff, Charles H.
Moore, if plaintiffs' Ex. 5 is good.
H the Court should hold that the above deeds are
not valid, the plaintiffs are estopped to claim title by
reason of passively looking on and suffering defendant
to enter into the contract of purchase and expend his
money on the land and cause the taxes to be paid in an
erroneous opinion of title, without making known their
claim.

Clark vs. Kirby & \\ilson, 18 Ut. 258, wherein the
m,axim applicable to such a case is stated: "He who is
silent when conscience requires him to speak, shall be
debarred from speaking when conscience requires him
to keep silent. '' The case is in point.
Also,
21 C. J. pp. 1160-61, Sec. 163.
48 L. R. A. (XS) pp. 754 and 759.
11
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The plaintiffs are estopped from claiming title by
failure to return the benefits at the time of filing their
reply. This is particularly true of the defendant, Charles
H. Moore, who held a deed for his part of the exchanged
land. Plaintiffs' Ex. 7.
See:
21 C. J. Page 1206, Sec. 207.
Florence Oil, etc. vs. McCandles,
1084.

(Colo~)

58 Pac.

The above disposes of the remainder of plaintiffs'
assignments of error to the Findings.
If defendant should fail in its defense through estoppel, it would still be entitled to specific performance.
The Court having attained jurisdiction of both the
parties and the subject matter of the action, will retain
that jurisdiction until justice is done.
Kinsman et al. vs. Utah Gas & Coke Co., (Ut.)
177 Pac. 418.
Under the circumstances as outlined in this eaR8 th~
defendant is entitled to Specific Performance of the
Contract of- Exchange.
See Hogan vs. Swayze, 65 U t. 380, where specific
performance was granted.
In the case of Gallagher vs. Gallagher (W. Vo.)
5 S. E. 299, the Court said:
''The fraud which will entitle the purchaser
to a specific performance is that which consists

12
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in setting up the stntute against tlu.\ perfo•·mance
after the purchaser hns beE'n induced to make
expenditures, or a rhangt' of 8i t nn til)n in regard
to the subject matter of the a.greement upon the
supposition that it "·ns to be rnrried into e~ecu
tion, and the nssumption of rights thereby to be
acquired: so that the rt)fusal to completP the Pxecution of the n~rt)ment is not nterelv n dt'nial of
rights which it intended to confer: but the infliction of an unjust and unconscientious injury
and loss. In surh case the Vt\11dor is held bv force
of his arts or silent acquiescence, "·hieh have misled the purchaser to his harm, to be estopped
from setting up the Statute of Frauds."
The above doctrine is cited with approval in the
e.ase of Bracken et al. \S. Chad burn et al. (Ut.) 185 Pac.
1021.

EXCILL'\GE OF POSSESSIOX . .-\.XD
niPROVEMEXTS

~lAKING

Where in pursuance of an oral agreement for the
exchange of lands the possession of the land which each
party is to receive from the other is taken and valuable
improvements are made thereon, it is universally held
that this i$ a sufficient part performance of the contract
for exchange to take the contract out of the operation
of the statute of frauds so that a court of equity may
decree its specific performance.
Purcell ,. . ~liner, 4
Wall. 513, 18 L. S. (L. ed.) 435; lrnion Pac. R. Co. v.
:McAlpine, 129 1:. S. 305, 9 S. Ct. 286, 32 U. S. (L. ed.)
673, affirming 23 Fed. 168; Gilbert v. Sleeper, 71 Cal.
290, 12 Pac. 172; Armstrong v. Fearnaw, 67 Ind. 429;
School Dist. Xo. 1 'y. Holt, 226 Mo. 406, 126 S. W. 462,
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136 Am. St. Rep. 651; Brown v. Bailey, 159 Pa. St. 121,
28 Atl. 245; Jermyn v. McClure, 195 Pa. St. 245, 45 Atl.
938. In Evins v. Sandefur-J ulian Co. 81 Ark. 70, 98 S.
w. 677.

See Annotation 1n Am. Ann. Cas. 1912 A Pages
308-311.
The further comment is made that the Supreme
Court will give much consideration to the trial Court's
Findings.
Kinsman et al. vs. Utah Gas & Coke Co. (Ut.)
177 Pac. 418.
And the Conclusions and Decree are such as would
follow and are sustained by the Findings of the lower
Court.
ARGUMENT
There was a valid contract of exchange followed by
the execution and delivery of deeds, with the exception
of plaintiff, Samuel Moore, who rfused the deed tendered.
At no place do the plaintiffs deny such contract, but
seek to avoid it by claiming that they were entitled to the
land between the tracks to the cross fence in Sec. 32, and
claiming the right to deal with the Live Stock Company
direct. Samuel Moore testified, ''I am ready to deal
with the Live Stock Company direct in this exchange.
I would not deal with the Moore Company even if I get
the same thing." "Neither company has ever offered me
a dede to the ground betwen tracks west of Section 21
14
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~

and do,vn to th t'ross-ft'Uc~ ... ( .:\ bs. ;)~L-HI, Trans. 68-()9).
Respondent belit.\Yl'S that thi~ h'stiwouy •.:ll'Urly sots forth
the appellnnts · eonteution.

But they nrt' not justified in taking this position
against the LiYe Stock ('ompnny.
In the first plat•e plaintiffs kn~"· just what the deal
was, an exchange of lands entered into between their
father. DanJ Moore, and the defendant company, which
exchange included some lands of the plaintiffs. See
Plffs. Ex. 1.

Seeond, Samuellioore helped to make the deal, went
O\er the ground and helped fix the lines, well knowing
that part of plaintiffs· land was included and that defen. .
dant relied on getting this land. Samuel even built many
of the fences. (Re.spt . .A.bs.. 13-14, Trans. 164-166.
Third. The Deseret Live Stock Company went into
the possesion of the ground it received under the exchange, which included the plaintiffs' said land, made
valuable improvements thereon in reliance on the con..
tract, with the knowledge, consent and acquiescence of
the plaintiffs. (Abs. 58-61, Trans. 163-172, and other
testimony).
Fourth. These plaintiffs and David Moore & Sons,
Inc., entered into the possession of the land received
under the exchange from the defendant company, made
improvments thereon and had the use and products of
same (Respts. Abs. 5-7, Trans. 97-104. Testimony o.f
Samuel ~fogre, "Since 1919 Charles and I have occu-
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tl

pied the land between the tracks, from the cross fence
near the ranch house on Sec.. 32 up to the South line of
Section 16 by grazing my cattle and putting up hay on
it. Live Stock Company has occupied that part of Sec.
16 north of the tracks.'' ( Abs. 35, Trans. 49-51. Respts.
Abs. 7, Trans. 99-101).
Fifth. Each party claimed the land as his own.
(Respts. Abs. 6, Trans. 97-100.)
Sixth. An arrangement as to the payment of taxes
on the lands exchanged was entered into whereby each
paid on the record title for the use of the equitable
titl holder. (Henry Moss, Respts. Abs. 11-12, Trans. 152155).
Seventh. On December 1st, 1921, an arrangement
(to which defendant was not a party and knew nothing
of until the commencement of this suit, See testimony of
William Moore, Abs. 67, Trans. 208) was entered into
between these plaintiffs and David Moore & Sons, In.,
dividing the lands each was to receive under the exchange. (See Plffs. Ex. 8, and Testimony of Wm. Moore,
Abs. 31, Trans. 19-24).
Eighth. Defendant continued to use the land it
had received under the exchange in the same way and
under the same conditions without objection on the part
of plaintiffs until the fall of 1927, just prior to the
commencement of this action. At the commencement of
the suit defendant was in the same way holding the
land.

16
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~inth.

Tht~ plaintiff~

aud P~tYi\l ~oort' & 8on~, l1w.,
at the eomtneuet'\Ull'llt of the 8uit ''"l're likewise holding
the land r~iYl'd f~·om dl'fl'Hdnut

Ten. Sometime after December l~t. 19~1, a dispute
aro~e bet"-:o~n the plaintiff~ nnd Dn Yid Moore & Sons,
me. , as to the lo~ation of ~aid cro~s-fence. This dispute
was never rommunicated to the defendant. (See testimony of Sterns HRteh, (~-\.hs. 57-58, Trans. 159-163) ;
William ~oss, (~\bs. 58-l)O. Trans. 163-177); Henry Moss,
(.!.bs. 56, Trans. 155-158). These parties merely knew
there was some friction between the Moore interests.
A.cting in aecordanc with the sum of the foregoing
ten propositions. the defendant and David Moore & Sons,
Inc. on Dec. 12~ 19~7, closed the deal by the execution
of deeds and a mortgage to secure the difference, in accordanc with the terms of the contract of Exchange,
plff~~ Ex. l. LThus leaving the plajnti:ffs and David
Moore & Sons, Ine., to settle between themselves_ any
ctiwut~ they might have as to the di\ision Qf lanq~ receh-ed by them under the contract, such parties _.Qn Dec.
1st, 1921, lJ_a"ring entered into such an agreement.
Defendant could not ha\e dealt direct with the plaintiffs had it desired to do so. The contract which plaintiffs haq acquiesced in and acted under and made their
own fro~ 1919 to 19.17, was a contract between defen<Jant on the one hand and David Moore and Sons, Inc.
Qn t}l~ other hand. The consideration for plaintiffs letting part of their lands go to defendant under the contract was a division of lands which defendant let David
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Moore & Sons, Inc. have under the contract. Such is
clearly evidenced by the minute entry (Plffs. Ex. 8) and
the testimony as to the location of the cross-fence. This
exchange of lands involved many hundreds of acres of,
which the plaintiffs' land in the exchange was but a fraction. When David Moore & Sons, Inc. complied with its
part of the Exchange Contract, defendant was bound to
convey in accordance with the terms of said contract.
It could not convey to the plaintiffs land which was under
the contract to be conveyed to David Moore and Sons,
Inc. without its consent. The point that plaintiffs over
look, is that through their actions and words over a period of years, and in the beginning at the inception of the
contract, they made it their contract in so far as their
land covered therein is concerned in this transaction.
"Equitable estoppel may be established by
proof of silence when conscience requires one to
speak, by acts or language.'' ( 18 U t. 258).
When plaintiffs brought this action the defendant
pleaded the whole fact and was bound to make an offer
of and do equity so far as in its power. To comply with
this a deed was tendered to plaintiff Samuel l\1oore in
accordance with David Moore & Sons, Inc. contention
as to the location of the cross fence. Plffs. Ex. 4. This
deed was refused. A deed \vas tendered to the plaintiff, Charles H. Moore for his part of the exchange and
Plaintiffs could do no more,
accepted. Plffs. Ex. 7.
particularly in view of the fact t~1at the whole of the
dispute as to the land to be received by plaintiffs is
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bet"·et\ll tht'lll~t~lYt'~ n nd a third party. w hout th<\y did

not ehoo~e t•..' makt' n pnrty t•J thi~ aetion.

Plaintitl"s try to HYllid tht'ir dt't\ds. 'fht'y c:lnim that

T. E.
()f

-!S,

llot)Or~ purloint'd tht'

dtled. PI tis. Ex.

~.

In view

th~ pl)~itiY~ tt'~timony
Tran~. 10~), .A.b~.

of T. ~~- ~Ioore, (Respts. Abs.
5c). 1.,rans. 149) and the surounding

eireumstanct'~. ~ueh

is not the case. If he had stolen
this deed.. then why did Samuel ~Ioore not convey the
word specially to the defendant company·? He said
nothing. (See A.bs. 39, Trans. 66). T. E. Moore was the
president of David :Moore & Sons, Inc. It was a grantor
in the deed, and 1Ioore was the natural person to have
and deliver the deed in this exchange of lands with his
eompany. Counsel for appellants deal in much inference in discussing this matter at page 13 of their brief.
It is singular that both copies of the contract locating
eross fence should disappear and the original too, and
even more singular that none of them were given to
Mr. T. E. :Moore as President of David Moore & Sons,
Inc., and that he should neYer have been appirsed of
them. (Respts. ...\.bs. 8, Trans. 106). (D. E. Moore, Abs.
64, Trans. 191). D. E. Moore was a director of the company. And it is even more singular that counsel for appellants can find in the record one line where it states
directly or by inference that Samuel Moore was (memtally) sick, ''Xon Compis ~Ientis". Or that D. E. Moore
had practically sold all his belonging in the company.
If the little safe has any bearings on the matter this discrepancy in the testimony of Samuel Moore and his wife
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is shown: Samuel Moore testifies, ''I am sure I got it
(the safe) from T. E. Moore and not my wife." (Abs.
39, Trans. 65). Mrs. Moore testifies, ''My children and
I went to his house (T. E. Moore's house) and got it."
(the safe) ( Abs. 40, Trans. 70).
Plaintiffs try to avoid the deed of Charles H. Moore,
Plffs. Ex. 5, on the ground of mental incapacity, etc.
Their evidence in this respect was ruled out by the
Court. (See Trans. 224-225.) However, this comment
might be made in passing. Samuel Moore introduced in
evidence a power of attorney executed by Charles H.
Moore to Samuel on Sept. 14, 1926, Plffs. Ex. 9, and
a purp~o.rted lease executed by Charles H. Moore to
Samuel Moore under date of Feb. 9, 1927, Plffs. Ex.
10. Each before the execution of said deed. Sam seemed
to feel Charles was competent to do business.
Now, regardless of anything else in the case. If the
cross fence to which Sam was to get the land was as
contended by David Moore & Sons, Inc., on the west line
of Sec. 21, and deeds were tendered substantially in accordance with this understanding, then certainly he has
·no cause of action.
The greater weight of the testimony sustains this
contention. See minutes of Dec 1, 1921. Plffs. Ex. 8.
Testimony of T. E. Moore. The cross fence referred
to in the minutes of Dec. 21, 1921, was the cross fenc~
a little west of the west line of Sec. 21. There is another
cross fence in Sec. 32. It is about a mile below the
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ment. I haYt' bt't'll prt'~idt.'llt of tht.\ etHnpany t.'\'Pr sineo
it~

inet)rporation.·· (.\h~. 47-8. Trn11~. 104-7.)

David

··Tht."'l"t' W~l~ in 1~)19 ~lntl no\\· is onp cross fence
nE:'ar the soutl1 line of ~t\(a. ~1. It is probably as old as I
am. I sa\Y it Yt:\nr~ ago. It i~ the tirst rross fence south
of Sec. lt1. and the nrxt i~ dow·n by the corner of 29
and 3~: · ( ...\b~. G4. Trans. 1~1~-194.) William Moss,
(Respts. A.bs. lt1. Trans. 17 4).
E.

~r~_)~.)rt\

Samuel Moore was in possession of this land as an
employee of the company (land in Sec. 32) T. E. Moore,
(A.bs. 48. Trans. 11-13) : D. E. Moore, (Abs. 64, Trans.
194): Clarence F. Moore, (.A.bs. 62, Trans. 181).
Samuel Moore tried to purchase from David Moore
& Sons. Inc. the land in Sec. 32. Testimony Clarence F.
:lloore, (Re3pts. _\.bs. 19-~0. Trans. 186); D. E. Moore,
(A.bs. 64. Trans. 194).
Sam and John E. Moore entered into a written contract to buy the land between the tracks in Sec. 32. See
Defts. E:xs. C & D., and testimony ofT. E. Moore, Respts.
(A.bs. 8-9, Trans. 113-1:2rJ). Being an employee and said
contract to purchase accounts for Sam's possession of
the land in 32 to the fall of 1927. His offers to purchase
are admissions that he did not own it.
Sam gets approximately the same acreage when he
is gi\en whole interest in Sec. 16 and in 21 between the
tracks. He gets much more in value if he also gets the
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other acreage. Testimony of T. E. Moore, (Abs. 49,
Trans. 110-112).
Further, to go between the tracks from Sec. 16 where
Sam owns his land to the cross fence in Sec. 32 or visa
versa, the cross-fence on the west line of Sec. 21 is
crossed. Then why was it not explained or excluded
unless it is the cross fence intended~
If the fences are moved back on the lines the loss
to defendant will not be so much in damages, though
this will amount to several hundred dollars, but the irreparable injury caused through being unable to keep
the fences up on account of the snow. Testimony of
Wm. Moss, (Respts. Abs. 13-14, Trans. 165-8.
Respectfully submitted,

P. H. NEELEY,
Coalville, Utah,
Attorney for Respondent.
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